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THE ELEMENT OF MATERIALITY IN THE FEDERAL CRIME
OF PERJURY
RICHARD

B.

LILLIcHt

"You can be the meanest crook on earth and never
go to jail," agreed Mr. Tutt. "Plain lying is not a
crime, but lying under oath is a crime,-yet only provided it is done in a legal proceeding and relates to a
material matter. Nobody on earth knows what is
'material' and what isn't." Train, The Adventures of
Ephraim Tutt 541 (1930).
The federal perjury statute provides that a person under oath who
states or subscribes any "material matter" which he does not believe to be
true commits the felony of perjury.' This requirement of materiality,
introduced into the common law by Lord Coke' and perpetuated in federal and state statutes, has long been considered one of the essential elements of the crime of perjury.3 If the alleged false statement is not material, federal perjury is not committed since a defendant can be "convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of the crime charged
against him." 4 Federal courts since 1927 have deemed the question of
what is a "material matter" one of law for the court.'
This article, after an analysis of seventy-seven years of federal case
law, arrives at three general conclusions. First, that federal courts have
tMember of the New York Bar; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana
University, Spring 1960.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1958).
2. See, e.g., King, Perjury in Illiwis, 17 ILL. L. Rsv. 596, 600 (1923); A Study of
Perjur3, Leg. Doc. No. 60(F) at 12-15, Report N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n 229, 238-41
(1935) (hereinafter cited as "1935 Report").
3. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 54 Fed. 488, 489 (S.D. Ala. 1892) ; United
States v. Landsberg, 23 Fed. 585, 586 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); People v. Teal, 196 N.Y.
372, 376, 89 N.E. 1086, 1087 (1909); 1 BURDICK, LAW OF CRIMES 484, 497 (1946);
RoscoE, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRI INAL CASES 755 (2d ed. 1840).
4. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 90 (1949).
5. Carroll v. United States, 16 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763

(1927).
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expanded the ordinary meaning of the word "material" to a point where
it might as well be omitted from the statute. Second, that federal trial
judges, by instructing juries that alleged false statements are material,
have deprived defendants of their right to a trial by jury on this essential
element of the crime charged. Third, that the Supreme Court, by studiously refusing to review circuit court decisions in perjury cases,6 has condoned these two dangerous developments in this area of federal criminal
law, thus necessitating prompt remedial legislation. Criticism of the federal perjury law and its interpretation is long overdue, for, as the Fifth
Circuit recently wrote, "heinous as the crime of perjury is under our law,
it is entitled to no relaxation of the constitutional guaranty of the citizens
in order to punish it." 7
I.

M\IATERIALITY IN FEDERAL COURTS

Punishing witnesses for perjury was a relatively late development in
England, for at early common law the prevailing mode of trial did not
require witnesses.8 Whther much later "perjury in a witness was punishable by the common law," 9 as Coke says, is still the subject of debate."
However, by 1600, "through a combination of legislative action and the
Star Chamber's exercise of jurisdiction, the crime of perjury had been
firmly ensconced in the law."" Forty-four years later the offense was
crystallized with the publication of Coke's Third Institute. Listing the
elements of the crime, Coke specified that the false statement must be "in
a matter material to the issue, or cause in question. For if it be not material, then though it be false, yet it is no perjury, because it concerneth
not the point in suit, and therefore in effect it is extrajudicial. ' 1"2 More
than a century later Blackstone made the same point when he observed
that the false statement "also must be in some point material to the question in dispute; for if it only be in some trifling collateral circumstance,
to which no regard is paid, it is no more penal than in the voluntary extrajudicial oaths before mentioned."" Thus at the time of the American
Revolution immaterial false testimony, incapable of influencing the court
6. See, e.g., Siegel v. United States, 263 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1959),
U.S. 1012 (1959) ; United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952),
U.S. 965 (1952) ; United States v. Hirsch, 136 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1943),
U.S. 759 (1943) ; Woolley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1938),
U.S. 614 (1938) ; Carroll v. United States, suptra n. 5.
7. Brooks v. United States, 240 F.2d 905, 906 (5th Cir. 1957).
8. 1935 Report at 235.
9.

3 COKE, INSTITUTES *164.

10. 1935 Report at 236-37, 246.
11. Id. at 237.
12.

3 COKE, INSTITUTES *167.

13.

4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137.

cert. denied, 359
cert. denied, 343
cert. denied, 320
cert. denied, 305
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or jury on the basic issue, would not support a perjury charge." Whether
the statement was material or not was usually left to the jury, 5 although
some cases held this to be a question of law for the court's determination." This split of English case law'" was resolved by the Perjury Act
of 1911, which specifically states that "materiality is a question of law
to be determined by the court."'
In the United States the first federal perjury statute omitted the element of materiality,"0 but the requirement was introduced into the federal
crime in 1873.20 In construing the phrase "material matter" the federal
courts naturally had recourse to state decisions, which by this time had
considerably broadened the term's scope. The New York Court of Appeals, for instance, stated in 1874 that "It is not necessary that the false
statements should tend directly to prove the issue in order to sustain an
indictment. If the matter falsely sworn to is circumstantially material
or tends to support and give credit to the witness in respect to the main
fact, it is perjury."21 This interpretation of the phrase encompassing
matter only indirectly relevant to the issues being tried was quickly
adopted by the federal bench.22
Although such a construction takes liberty with the dictionary definition of "material," 2 it can be rationalized where the false statements
are made in open court upon the trial of a law suit. In such circumstances
the trial judge, by exercising his preliminary power of ruling on the materiality of evidence for admissibility purposes, necessarily excludes much
immaterial matter and directs the thrust of the evidence toward matter
which is generally material. Thus a witness at a trial can expect most of
his testimony to be material in nature. Where the false testimony is not
given at a trial, however, but before a grand jury, administrative agency
or congressional committee, all of which may stray far afield with no
judge to exclude irrelevant matter, a literal interpretation of "material"
is preferable since a witness has little idea whether his testimony is ma14. Rex v. Griepe, 12 Mod. 139, 88 Eng. Rep. 1220 (K.B. 1692), is a typical case
illustrating this point.
15. Regina v. Goddard, 2 F. & F. 361, 175 Eng. Rep. 1096 (N.P. 1861); Regina v.
Lavey, 3 Car. & K. 26, 175 Eng. Rep. 448 (Q.B. 1850).
16. Regina v. Phillpotts, 2 Den. 302, 169 Eng. Rep. 514 (1851).
17. 1 RUSSELL, CRIME 308-09 (10th ed. 1950).
18. 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 6, § 1(6).
19. Act of April 3, 1790, ch. 9, § 18, 1 Stat. 116.
20. Act of December 1, 1873, ch. 4, § 5392, 18 Stat. 1050.
21. Wood v. People, 59 N.Y. 117, 123 (1874).
22. United States v. Shinn, 14 Fed. 447, 453 (C.C. Ore. 1882); United States v.
Landsberg, 23 Fed. 585, 586 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882).
23. "Of solid or weighty character; substantial; of consequence; not to be dispensed with; important." WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY (2d ed. 1945).
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terial or not. Were material read to mean "circumstantially material" in
these three instances, United States Attorneys would find it immeasurably
easier to secure perjury convictions.
Such a situation has, in effect, developed since the 1927 decision in
Carroll v. United States,24 where a grand jury was investigating whether
Earl Carroll had served champagne at a theatre party in violation of the
Prohibition Act. Carroll testified that he had served ginger ale from
an ice-cooled bath tub, and when asked whether anyone had bathed in
the tub he responded in the negative. Actually a Miss Joyce Hawley had
slipped off her chemise and jumped into the tub, whereupon Carroll had
announced that "the line forms to the right; come up, gentlemen." At
Carroll's trial for perjury, the trial judge ruled that his false testimony
that no one was in the tub was material to the grand jury's investigation.
This determination was affirmed unanimously on appeal, the Circuit
Court formulating the following principles concerning the materiality of
testimony before grand juries:
This body has powers of investigation and inquisition; the
scope of the inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions
of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation . . . When a witness is summoned before that tribunal, he

is bound to tell what he knows in answer to questions framed
for the purpose of bringing out the truth of the matter under
inquiry. .

.

. The grand jury investigation does not necessarily

cease after it has heard the witness brought before it by the
United States attorney. Its investigation and full duty is not
performed unless and until every clue has been run down and
all witnesses searched for and examined in every proper way
to find if a crime has been committed, and to charge the proper
person with the commission thereof. Its investigation proceeds
step by step. A false statement by a witness in any of the steps,
though not relevant in an essential sense to the ultimate issues
pending before the grand jury, may be material, in that it tends
to influence or impede the course of the investigation.2"
In formulating this test, the court was following closely the words
and reasoning of the Supreme Court in Blair v. United States.20 In applying it, the court reasoned that the line of questioning which Carroll
was subjected to concerned material matters, since the questions were con24.
25.
26.

16 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927).
16 F.2d at 953. (Emphasis added.)
250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
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ceived for the purpose of learning who was at the party so that they might
be called as witnesses.
The identification of the woman who stepped into the bathtub
might also serve to produce a witness. A false statement as to
the woman tended to mislead the grand jury, and to deprive
them of knowledge as to who she was, so that she might not be
obtained as a witness. . . . Clearly one who stepped into the
bathtub by smell, sight, or taste, could testify as to whether or
not it contained champagne. Thus the materiality of this testimony is made clear. . . . [Carroll's] statements were plainly
calculated to dissuade the grand jury from further investigation. It would distort the plain meaning of the word "ma7
terial" to hold otherwise.1
While the court undoubtedly reached a correct decision in the Carrollcase,
its sweeping language whittled down the concept of immaterial testimony
in grand jury cases.
The Carroll approach was applied subsequently to false statements
before federal administrative agencies. In Woolley v. United States"
the defendant, during a hearing before a Securities and Exchange Commission officer, falsely denied having a connection with a certain oil
company. His conviction of perjury was affirmed on appeal, the court
stating:
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a factfinding body, performs a function similar to that of a grand
jury. . . . Such a body is not constrained by technical rules of
admissibility. . . . The test of materiality is whether the false
testimony has a natural tendency to influence the fact-finding
agency in its investigation. If the testimony has such a tendency it will support a conviction for perjury. See Carroll v.
United States, 2 Cir., 16 F.2d 951.29
Here again materiality was predicated not on the fact that the false testimony concerned the main issue under investigation but on the theory that
it was susceptible of influencing the agency's investigation as a whole.
The Carrolltest, when applied to false testimony given before a congressional committee, also has the effect of virtually eliminating the re0
quirement of materiality. In United States v. Moran,"
for instance, the
27. 16 F.2d at 953-54.
28. 97 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 614 (1938).
29. 97 F.2d at 262. (Emphasis added.)
30. 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 965 (1952).
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defendant testified falsely before the Kefauver Committee that while he
was in public office a Louis Weber had visited him several times. When
it was learned that Weber's visits had been much more frequent, M\oran
was tried and convicted of perjury. On appeal he argued that the number
of times Weber had visited him was immaterial to the committee's investigation. The court replied:
We disagree. The authorized investigation covered a broad
field, as appears from the Resolution creating the Committee.
Tlw test of nmateriality of false testimony is whetler the testimony has a natural effect or tendency to influeice, impede or
dissuade the investigating body from pursuing its investigation
[citing Carrollv. United States and other cases].... Such was

the case here. Part of the Committee's investigation concerned
the relationship between public officials and organized crime.
Moran was an official; Weber a convicted gambler. The number of times they met could well have a bearing on the intimacy
of their relations, and false statements by Moran as to the frequency of those meetings could thwart or impede the inquiry
and prevent disclosure of other facts. 8'
The above three cases show how the element of materiality has all
but been read out of the statute when false testimony is given before
grand juries, administrative agencies and congressional committees. The
Carrollapproach has even been adopted in cases where the testimony was
given at a trial. Hence: "The materiality required is not as to any particular issue in the case, but as to the trial as a whole, that is, materiality
is determined by whether the false testimony was capable of influencing
the tribunal on the issue before it." 2 In this fashion materiality, once
"an excellent safeguard of rogues,""8 has been excised from the crime."
Two other developments, one early and one relatively recent, have
contributed to this result. The first is the argument that a false statement is material, no matter how collateral to the proceeding in which it is
given, because it tends to strengthen the credibility of a witness. Under
this "bootstrap" theory of materiality any answer, even when given on
cross-examination and on an issue admittedly not before the court,"8 may
31.

194 F.2d at 626. (Emphasis added.)

32. Blackmon v. United States, 108 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1940).
33. "The Genesis of Perjury," 25 J. Juris. 491, 493 (1881).
34. Cf. People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372, 378, 89 N.E. 1086, 1088 (1909) : "We read
the statute as we find it. If it is ever deemed wise to take out of the statute defining
perjury the element of materiality in the false testimony given . . . that should be done
by legislative enactment and not by judicial construction."
35. Luse v. United States, 64 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1933).
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be deemed material. In United States v. Shinn,0 the earliest federal case
employing this credibility-materiality complex, the court observed:
"[W]hen the superfluous or collateral mattter [testified to falsely] is
calculated and intended to prop and bolster the testimony of the witness
on some material point, as by clothing it with circumstances which add to
its probability or strengthen the credibility of the witness, the [testimony
is material].""

The idea that "superfluous," i.e. immaterial, false testimony can be
converted into material testimony by means of the credibility fiction has
found favor in the years following Shina. s It is grounded on a fundamental failure to distinguish between what is material for admissibility
purposes and what constitutes material matter as an element of the crime
of perjury. This confusion is perfectly illustrated by Claiborne v. United
States," where collateral testimony by a grand jury witness was deemed
material as bearing on his credibility. The case cited as authority was
not even a perjury case, but one concerning the admissibility of evidence
of criminal acts for the purpose of impeaching a witness.4" While almost
anything may be material (in the sense of being admissible) when used to
attack a witness's credibility, it does not follow that all false statements
by a witness are material (for purposes of a perjury prosecution) because
they might bear on the witness's credibility. Here, as in the case of
whether the judge or jury determines materiality,4 it appears that materiality for admissibility purposes has been substituted for materiality as
an element of the crime. Carried to its logical extreme, the credibility
theory absolutely eliminates the requirement, since any statement by a
witness can be construed as reflecting in some remote fashion on his
credibility. Questioned only once,42 the credibility argument has been
36. 14 Fed. 447 (C.C. Ore. 1882).
37. Id. at 453. (Emphasis added.) Cf. RoscoE, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL CASES 764 (2d ed. 1840).
38. United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Blackmon v. United States,
108 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1940) ; United States v. Slutzky, 79 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1935)
United States v. Allen, 131 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Mich. 1955). See also United States v.
Landsberg, 23 Fed. 585 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882). The states have followed suit: Wood v.
People, 59 N.Y. 117 (1874) ; People v. Courtney, 94 N.Y. 490 (1884) ; People v. Morris,
155 App. Div. 711, 140 N.Y. Supp. 887 (1913). Commentators are in agreement: Note,
26 IOWA L. REv. 404, 405 (1941) ; 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1311

(1957).

39. 77 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1935).
40. Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1924).
41. See text at notes 56-65 infra.
42. This approach to materiality was rejected under the particular fact situation
of United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956), where the court dismissed
an indictment despite the government's contention that the alleged false testimony was
material because it bore on Icardi's credibility. "The court has not overlooked the Government's argument that the matters sought to be elicited by these six questions were
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uniformly successful in securing perjury convictions for the government
and has frequently been used to secure affirmance of a doubtful appeal.4"
The second and more recent development which has eased the government's burden in proving materiality also stems from the confusion between admissibility-materiality and perjury-materiality. A notewriter in
1941, examining the federal decisions which had construed the materiality
requirement, concluded that:
[T]he courts have not looked solely at the alleged false statements in relation to the purposes for which they were elicited.
Rather, they seem to have placed considerable emphasis upon
the propriety of the question which called for the statement. If
the question asked of the witness, or affiant, was a proper
one-one directed at information which the questioner had a
right to know-then the courts seem to have regarded the
answering statement as "material." A question apparently has
been thought proper if it could properly be permitted over an
objection that it was irrelevant or immaterial. 4
This wide open approach to materiality was solemnized eighteen years
later in a decision by judge Learned Hand who, assuming that the appellants' false answers before a grand jury could not have impeded its
investigation, nevertheless found them to be material.
The error of the appellants' position is that they confuse the
"materiality" of the question with the "materiality" of the
answer, as though it was proof that the question was immaterial,
if the answer would have been so. It is, however, at once apparent that this substitutes the opinion of the witness for that
of the tribunal as to the "materiality" of the answer. No matter how right the witness might be in believing that the answer
would not contribute to the investigation, he was bound to
leave that decision to the tribunal. A question is "material,"
material because, if Icardi had impressed the subcommittee with his credibility and had
produced substantial corroborative evidence, the subcommittee might have concluded that
he was innocent. In the face of the evidence that, as of the time he was questioned,
Icardi's answers could have no effect upon the subcommittee's conclusions in the field of
legitimate congressional investigations, this slim conjecture cannot support a finding by
this court, as a matter of law, that Icardi's answers related to a material matter.
Whether Icardi denied or confessed guilt by his answers, his testimony could not have
influenced the subcommittee's conclusion on subjects which might be legitimately under
investigation." Id. at 389. This case represents the sole check on permitting irrelevant
testimony to be deemed material by means of the credibility catalyst.
43. Brief in opposition to petition for certiorari, pp. 16-17, Siegel v. United States,
359 U.S. 1012 (1959).
44. Note, 26 IowA L.Ray. 404, 406 (1941).
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nzo matter what the answer imay be, unless it appearsby its terms
that the answer cannot be "material."4 5
Judge Hand's test, which shifts the emphasis from the answer to
the question and makes any false answer to a "material" question material for perjury purposes, relieves the government of actually proving
materiality. Henceforth the United States Attorney must only negate
the remote possibility that the answer could not have been material. Presumably this will be done by showing one or more hypothetical answers
which would be material. This substitutes what is conceivable for what
is fact, making perjury turn on an abstract intellectual proposition rather
than on probative evidence. In the process the burden of proof is subtly
shifted from the government to the accused.
The perjury statute measures materiality by what the witness
"states" or "subscribes," not by the terms of the question "no matter
what the answer may be." Judge Hand, overlooking this fact, no doubt
was swayed by Sinclairv. United States,46 a contempt case cited elsewhere
in his opinion in which the Supreme Court necessarily emphasized the
question and its connection to the subject under inquiry. In contempt
proceedings there is usually no answer to consider, and thus in determining the question of pertinency the court must examine the question in
its context. When a witness is prosecuted for an allegedly false and material answer, however, no amount of mental gymnastics should replace
the government's duty to come forth with common law proof of materiality.
From the above analysis of federal case law, it can be seen that the
element of materiality has been almost, if not entirely, emasculated by
the Carroll approach, the credibility concept and Judge Hand's test. A
quick glance through the federal reports shows that for this reason perjury has replaced conspiracy as the darling of the federal attorney's
nursery.

II.

DETERMINATION OF MATERIALITY

Judge Hand's recent opinion on materiality concluded: "It is scarcely
necessary to add that 'materiality' is always a question for the court."4 7
All categorical assertions call for critical examination, this more than
others. The Constitution guarantees a jury trial to those accused of
45. Siegel v. United States, 263 F.2d 530, 533 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
1012 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
46. 279 U.S. 263 (1929). The authorities cited by Mr. Justice Butler do not support his dictum that materiality in perjury cases is a question of law for the court.

47. 263 F.2d at 533.
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perjury. " s While federal trial judges determine the law,4" they may not
withdraw from the jury factual issues upon which there is any evidence,
even though the evidence be uncontroverted.5 ° The defendant in a federal criminal trial may not be deprived directly of this constitutional right
to a jury trial on disputed factual issues by being tried without a jury or
by allowing the trial judge to direct a verdict of guilty."' Nor may he be
deprived of this right indirectly by permitting the trial judge to instruct
the jury to find against the accused on any factual issue which is an essential element of the crime charged, even though the evidence against
the defendant is uncontroverted."2
When an essential element of the crime is not submitted to the jury
in a perjury case the conviction must be reversed because due process requires that "all the elements of the crime charged shall be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt." 3 Convictions are uniformly reversed for failure to
let the jury make factual determinations similar to that of materiality. 4
Yet, since the Carrollholding in 1927 that "whether . . . [the false testimony] was any 'material' matter was a question of law for the court,""
federal judges have ruled on the issue of materiality.
The Carrollrule that materiality is always for the court to determine
48.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; U. S. CONST. amend. VI.

49. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
50. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 533-40 (1958); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408 (1882).
51. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955) ; United Brotherhood v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947) ; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) ;
Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Wissel v. United States,
22 F.2d 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1927).
52. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946) ; Manuszak v. United States,
234 F.2d 421, 424-25 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Carothers v. United States, 161 F.2d 718, 722 (5th
Cir. 1947).
53. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 89 (1949).
54. Brooks v. United States, 240 F.2d 905, 906 (5th Cir. 1957) (authority of officer administering oath in perjury case) ; Carothers v. United States, 161 F.2d 718, 722
(5th Cir. 1957) (whether price ceiling had been exceeded) ; United States v. Manuszak,
234 F.2d 421, 424-25 (3d Cir. 1956) (whether stolen goods had been in interstate commerce) ; Schwachter v. United States, 237 F.2d 640 (6th Cir. 1956) (whether car was in
interstate commerce); Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
(sanity) ; United States v. Raub, 177 F.2d 312, 315-16 (7th Cir. 1949) (whether tax
scheme was fraud) ; United States v. Gollin, 166 F.2d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948) (whether shipment was interstate) ; Short v. United States, 91
F.2d 614, 620 (4th Cir. 1937) (defense of former jeopardy) ; Luse v. United States, 49
F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1931) (whether defendant gave perjured testimony) ; Konda v.
United States, 166 Fed. 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1908) (whether pamphlet was obscene).
Still other cases have permitted juries to determine issues of a type logically indistinguishable from the question of materiality. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19,
32 (1941) ; Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 244, 250 (1920); Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) ; United States v. O'Connor, 237 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1956) ;
Imboden v. United States, 194 F.2d 508, 513-14 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
957 (1952).
55. 16 F.2d at 954.
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undoubtedly was an outgrowth of the fact that courts pass on materiality
(1) when the admissibility of evidence is in question, and (2) when a
motion is made to dismiss the indictment. The fact that the courts determine materiality in these instances, however, is no reason for allowing
them to determine materiality as an essential substantive element of the
felony of perjury.
It has been demonstrated above that there is a great difference between determining materiality for admissibility purposes and as an element of the crime of perjury. 6 The Supreme Court, in another context,
has observed that matters which are initially questions of law when their
admissibility is disputed may become questions of fact for the jury's determination by the end of the trial." New York, refuting the idea that
materiality is something too difficult for juries to comprehend, has expressly adopted this approach in perjury cases.
While as lawyers we are accustomed to thinking of materiality
as a matter for judicial ruling, there is nothing in the nature or
quality of materiality which makes it essentially a legal concept
or removes it from the ken of a layman's discernment and determination. The word "material" and the idea of materiality are
commonly understood, and every day judgments on a variety of
subjects are made upon the basis of a layman's sense of materiality.
In the last analysis questions of materiality cannot be removed from a jury's consideration. Although to an exclusionary extent the court may rule out evidence as immaterial, it
does not follow that the materiality of the evidence admitted
is not something for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence. When we say that the materiality of evidence is for the
court but the weight to be given to it is for the jury, we only indicate a certain separation in the function of court and jury in
sifting the evidence. It would be a mistake to think that any
question of materiality is thereby removed from the jury's
sphere or that the jury process of weighing evidence is something entirely apart from judging its materiality.
What the law really does, in the interest of a fair trial
and reasonably controlled trial, is to vest in the court a preliminary power of ruling on the materiality of evidence to the
end that evidence which a jury should not consider at all may be
56. See text at notes 38-45 supra.
57. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 338 (1943).
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excluded from their consideration altogether. A ruling in favor of materiality means no more than that the jury may consider the evidence. Its materiality then becomes a question of
fact for the jury. And certainly materiality as a substantive
element of the crime of perjury is something more than materiality considered in an evidentiary ruling by the court. Materiality in such a case becomes a matter for ultimate determination by the decisional process."
The fact that the court determines materiality when a motion is
made to dismiss the indictment also caused many courts, including the one
in Carroll, to hold that the trial judge may pass upon materiality in all
instances. For example, the only federal authority cited in Carroll was
an 1892 district court case, United States v. Singleton,59 where a demurrer to a perjury indictment was sustained, the court holding that the
alleged false statement was not material. It is clear from the court's
opinion" that it was only stating the traditional role of the court in testing the legal sufficiency of the allegations in an indictment.61 No hint
is given that, had the indictment been held good and the case gone to trial,
the judge could then have ruled affirmatively that the requirement of
materiality had been met, thus removing this vital element of the crime
from the jury's contemplation. 2
The earliest federal decision dealing with the role of the court in the
determination of materiality, and one not cited in the Carrollopinion, is
United States v. Shinn,6" where again a demurrer to an indictment was
sustained. With the facts admitted for purposes of the demurrer the
58. People v. Clemete, 285 App. Div. 258, 261-62, 136 N.Y.S. 2d 202, 205-06 (1954),
aff'd mem., 309 N.Y. 890, 131 N.E.2d 294 (1955). (Emphasis added.) See Note, 21

L. REv. 273, 274 (1955).
59. 54 Fed. 488 (S.D. Ala. 1892).
60. Id. at 489.

BROOKLYN

61.

See, e.g., United States v. Bressi, 208 Fed. 369 (W.D. Wash. 1913); United

States v. Pettus, 84 Fed. 791 (W.D. Tenn. 1897) ; United States v. Perdue, 4 Fed. 897
(W.D. Pa. 1880).
62. Like Singleton, the leading New York case cited in the Carroll opinion involves
only the sufficiency of an indictment.

People ex rel. Hegeman v. Corrigan, 195 N.Y. 1,

87 N.E. 792 (1909). As a close reading of this case and subsequent decisions shows,
New York has never held that at the trial of the indictment the court may instruct the
jury that the alleged perjurous statement was material. A court may rule on materiality
at the indictment stage or hold the alleged false statement not material at trial. "I think,
however, that at such a trial such materiality is one of the questions of fact, which must
be submitted to the jury, and which the court cannot assume to decide as against the defendant."

People v. Redmond, 179 App. Div. 121, 123, 165 N.Y. Supp. 821, 823 (1917),

appeal dismissed, 225 N.Y. 206, 127 N.E. 785 (1919).

See Materiality it Perjury As a

Question of Law or a Question of Fact, Leg. Doc. No. 65(G) at 22, Report N.Y. Law

Rev. Comm'n 303, 322 (1939) (hereinafter cited as "1939 Report").
63. 14 Fed. 447 (C.C. Ore. 1882).
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court stated: "Where the facts are disputed, the question should be left
to the jury, with proper instructions from the court. But when the facts
are admitted the question of materiality is one for the court. 1 Whart.
Crim. Law, sec. 1284; State v. Bailey, 34 Mo. 350."64 There is no intimation that it was within the province of the court to rule affirmatively
on materiality should the case reach trial. That the comments of the
court were meant to apply solely to rulings on the pleadings is clear both
from the decision itself and the case cited by the court as authority."
The Carroll holding that materiality at trial is a question of law to
be determined by the judge has been followed unquestioningly since
1927.6" Not only is this generality historically incorrect, as the above
analysis shows, but it represents a begging of the basic question. The
element of materiality in the crime of perjury is essentially one of fact
and ought not, because of a misconception of the traditional role of the
judge in determining materiality or because some might think it better to
leave the question to the judge to decide than submit to the jury, to be
converted into a question of law and under that label automatically assigned to the court. Maguire and Epstein, discussing fact issues which
may govern a judge's ruling on admissibility (e.g., materiality) and
which may also be "an ultimate question on the merits," point out that
many of these problems have been entrusted to the jury.
Yet in many determinations on the merits we have deliberately
exchanged the comparative predictability of judge-made decision for the uncertainty of jury-made decision. One of the
reasons for doing so is that both litigants and society at large
are better satisfied. If that reason be at all sound, it applies
strongly here, where ex hypoth-esi evidential and ultimate problems coincide."
In light of the reasoning in the New York case mentioned above,6"
one may speculate whether allowing the jury to determine this essential
element of the crime would substitute uncertainty for predictability.
However, this is beside the point. Constitutionality must prevail over
any presumed desirability, and the conclusion appears inescapable that
when a trial judge is permitted to instruct a jury that an accused's false
64. Id. at 452. Textwriters are in accord: See 1 BuRDicK, LAW OF CRIMES 500
(1946) ; 3 WHARTON, CR ImiNAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 1310 (1957).
65. State v. Bailey, 34 Mo. 350 (1864), where an indictment was quashed.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1957) and the cases cited
therein.
67. Maguire and Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV.L. REv. 392, 415-16 (1927).
68. See text at note 58 supra.
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statement related to a material matter he thereby deprives the accused of
his constitutional right to a trial by jury of all the essential elements of
the crime charged.
III.

SUGGESTED LEGISLATION

Twenty-five years ago the New York State Law Revision Commission concluded that "the word 'material' is inherently ambiguous. In any
given context it may bear several interpretations. In short, as a criterion
of the criminality of a false statement, it is, taken by itself, worse than
useless." 69 Ironically, the problem today is not so much what the term
means as how to give it some meaning. The Supreme Court having refused to consider the problems raised in Parts I and II of the article,"0
Congress must be looked to for modification. Fortunately, in the case of
perjury, the plea for remedial legislation is more than mere wishful
thinking.
Senator Keating from New York is the author of a proposed perjury
statute introduced during the last session of Congress.7 ' Acting on the
belief that no one who swears falsely before a duly constituted tribunal
should go completely unpunished,7 2 his bill reflects the New York experience of dividing perjury into two degrees, requiring materiality for
first degree perjury-a felony-and eliminating the element from second
degree perjury-a misdemeanor."' Section 1621 of title 18 of the United
States Code would be amended to read as follows:
(a) Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the
United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he
will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or
subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be
true, is guilty of perjury in the first degree, and shall, except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined not more than
$2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) Whoever commits perjury under circumstances not
69. 1935 Report at 238.
70. See, e.g., Siegel v. United States, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959).
71. S. 1516, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
72. Letter from Kenneth B. Keating to the author, July 10, 1959. As indicated by
Part I, the concept of "material matter" has been so greatly expanded that the Senator's
concern is more theoretical than real.
73. See 1935 Report. The Senator, however, did not borrow all of New York's
experience in the matter. See 1939 Report and text at note 75 infra.
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amounting to perjury in the first degree, shall be fined not
more than $500 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 4
This amendment, in addition to meeting Senator Keating's stated objective, would encourage a more literal reading of the term material, since
the alternative to finding the false statement material would be second
degree perjury rather than dismissal of the indictment or acquittal. All
perjurers would be subject to criminal sanctions, but petty offenders
would receive a punishment more fitting their offense. Materiality once
again would have meaning.
One aspect of the proposed bill, however, needs clarification. In
making materiality the determining factor which distinguishes first degree from second degree perjury,"' it is not apparent whether the question of materiality has been transferred from the court to the jury. New
York's statute, which served as Senator Keating's model, contained a
similar omission, and twenty years passed before the courts had an opportunity to rule that materiality was definitely a jury question."6 Accordingly, it has been suggested to Senator Keating that he revise his bill
by modifying section (b) and adding section (c), to read:
(b) Whoever commits perjury under circumstances not
amounting to perjury in the first degree, in that the perjury did
not relate to a material matter, is guilty of perjury in the second
degree, and shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both.
(c) Upon an indictment for perjury in the first degree,
a jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged
74. S. 1516, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
75. Actually the fact that materiality distinguishes the two degrees of perjury is
not made clear by the proposed bill. The bill is derived from New York Penal Law §§
1620-a and 1620-b. However, New York has a general perjury prohibition, Penal Law §
1620, against which these sections must be read. It spells out the elements of the
crime; § 1620-a repeats these elements and adds materiality; and § 1620-b covers perjury
not amounting to perjury in the first degree under § 1620-a, i.e. perjury on immaterial
matters. The proposed bill, however, apparently has no general introductory section and
hence there is no way to determine that materiality distinguishes the degrees, since §
1621-b only states that "whoever commits perjury under circumstances not amounting to
perjury in the first degree" is guilty of perjury in the second degree. The question is
raised: what circumstances? Obviously materiality is intended, but this does not appear
on the statute's face. The omission could be remedied by revising § 1621-b to read:
"Whoever commits perjury under circumstances not amounting to perjury in the first
degree, in that the perjury did not relate to a material matter, . . ." Such a suggestion has been made to Senator Keating. See proposed revised bill in text at note 76
infra.
76. See text at note 58 supra. The 1939 Report recommended an amendment to the
statute which would have had this effect but it was never adopted.
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in the indictment, and may find him guilty of perjury in the
second degree.
Such a perjury law would not only fill the gap in Senator Keating's bill
and place the determination of materiality where it constitutionally belongs, but it might well increase convictions. For if the two degrees of
perjury were to be mutually exclusive and the trial judge permitted to
instruct the jury in a first degree perjury prosecution that the matter was
material, the jury could always disregard the judge's ruling, even if it
believed the accused had lied, and there would be no way to determine
this from the face of a verdict of not guilty. However, by giving the
jury in such a prosecution the option of convicting the defendant of perjury in the second degree, punishment of the offender is assured.
It should be pointed out that the perjury law proposed above is no
panacea. It is not guaranteed to stop witnesses from lying any more
than conflict of interest statutes have prevented public officials from
self-dealing. Morality cannot be legislated, and cross-examination or the
threat thereof will continue to be the major deterrent to false testimony.
However, such a statute, broad enough to prohibit all false swearing and
graded to permit adjustment of the degree of punishment to the seriousness of the offense, would no doubt serve to increase witness veracity. At
the same time it would halt the erosion of the requirement of materiality,
which has made perjury a catch-all crime, used to prosecute various forms
of alleged misconduct not falling within the scope of other offenses.
Increasing the scope of the crime of perjury by the use of fictions,
as has occurred during the past thirty years, should not be tolerated, for
they invariably lead to abuses and spawn the cynicism with which the
public and the bar now view many perjury prosecutions. While false
testimony cannot be condoned, it seems repugnant to our sense of justice
that a person may be branded a felon for giving testimony which had no
bearing upon the issue under inquiry and may well have been given because the line of questioning which evoked it was deemed wholly immaterial to the matter under investigation. A statute which would emphasize the importance of the materiality requirement for a felony conviction and yet punish immaterial false swearing as a misdemeanor would
insure respect for the integrity of our government and protect the rights
of those accused of the offense, thereby putting the crime of perjury in
its proper place in our federal criminal law.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956); United
States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (D. C. Cir. 1954).

